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Abstract
We show that in the canonical non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game, a sub-
game perfect equilibrium exists in pure stationary strategies, even when the space
of feasible payoﬀs is not convex. At such an equilibrium there is no delay. We also
have the converse result that randomization will not be used in this environment in
the sense that all stationary subgame perfect equilibria do not involve randomization
on the equilibrium path. Nevertheless, mixed strategy proﬁles can lead to Pareto
superior payoﬀs in non-convex cases.
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1 Introduction
Many problems in economics are complicated by the presence of non-convexities. Scarf
(1994) mentions the omnipresence of non-divisibilities in production as an important source
of non-convexities in economics. Another example of a non-convexities in production is
the existence of production technologies with increasing returns to scale. Other important
cases of non-convexities result from non-convexities in preferences, even in the presence of
lotteries when agents are not expect utility maximizers as is for instance the case in prospect
theory, see Kahneman and Tversky (1979), or when randomization is not possible, and
non-convexities in the consumption set, for instance caused by the presence of indivisible
commodities. Although non-convexities are regarded important, most of the economic
literature assumes them away for reasons of intractability.
Non-convexities are frequently studied in the n-person cooperative bargaining litera-
ture. There is for instance an extensive literature on the extension of the Nash bargaining
solution to non-convex environments (Kaneko (1980), Conley and Wilkie (1996), Mariotti
(1997), Zhou (1997), and Xu and Yoshihara (2006)). On the contrary, the literature on
strategic bargaining has not paid much attention to non-convexities and non-convexities
are only treated for the two-player case. Rubinstein (1982) allows for modest forms of
non-convexities. Under his hypothesis there is typically a unique equilibrium. Herrero
(1989) considers general non-convexities for the two-player case and obtains the existence
of a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies when the set of feasible payoﬀs
is strictly comprehensive. Conley and Wilkie (1995) also consider a strictly comprehensive
set of feasible payoﬀs and introduce a bargaining protocol that implements their extension
of the Nash bargaining solution.
Existence of a pure equilibrium in the canonical multilateral bargaining model has been
shown only when the set of feasible payoﬀs is convex. The existence of such an equilibrium
has been shown in Banks and Duggan (2000). Merlo and Wilson (1995) consider the
n-person cake division problem and obtain the existence of a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in stationary strategies when the set of feasible payoﬀs is convex and the
proposer selection protocol is deterministic.
We consider the following canonical multilateral bargaining procedure. In each time
period, nature randomly selects a player that is allowed to make a proposal. All players
respond sequentially to the proposal and either vote in favor or against. As soon as a
responder votes against the proposal, the procedure continues in the next period. If all
responders vote in favor of the proposal, it is accepted, and the procedure ends.
The bargaining game is fully characterized by the set of players, their discount factors,
the set of feasible payoﬀs, and the probability according to which nature selects a particular
proposer. The only assumptions we make regarding the set of feasible alternatives are non-
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substantial technical ones. It is assumed to be closed, comprehensive from below, and
the set of individually rational payoﬀs is assumed bounded from above. To make the
bargaining problem non-trivial, it is assumed that there is an alternative that gives all
players a strictly positive payoﬀ.
We show that this entire class of bargaining games has stationary subgame perfect
equilibria in pure strategies that ensure immediate agreement. This result is surprising as
the usual way to deal with non-convexities is to introduce lotteries. For that reason, one
might have expected that non-convex bargaining games possess mixed strategy equilibria
rather than pure ones. Similarly, one might have expected that non-convexities are a
potential source for delay.
We also address the reverse question. Under what conditions are all stationary subgame
perfect equilibria of a bargaining game in pure strategies without delay? The answer
is that an extremely mild additional assumption assures this: When the set of weakly
Pareto optimal alternatives coincides with the set of Pareto optimal ones, all stationary
subgame perfect equilibria involve no randomization on the equilibrium path. Equilibria
are characterized by the absence of delay.
To derive the ﬁrst main result, the existence result, we deviate from the usual proof
strategy that basically exploits continuity of the best-response correspondences. In our
non-convex setting, this correspondence may not be continuous. Instead, we construct
an excess utility function that resembles the excess demand function as used in general
equilibrium theory. Let some proﬁle of ex ante utilities be given and consider for each
player i the (potentially infeasible) proposal player i has to make in order to be consistent
with this proﬁle of ex ante utilities. Coordinate i of the excess utility function is the degree
of feasibility of this proposal. The excess utility function is shown to have a zero point by
showing that it is not outward pointing. Next, a zero point is shown to induce a subgame
perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies of the bargaining game.
To prove the second main result, roughly stating that all stationary subgame perfect
equilibria are in pure strategies, we proceed in several steps. One of the main steps is
to show in an equilibrium in mixed strategies, proposals oﬀering strictly more than the
continuation utility to all players are accepted with probability one, whereas proposals
oﬀering at least one player strictly less than the continuation utility are accepted with
probability zero. The next main step is to argue that for every player there is a unique
proposal which maximizes his utility subject to being accepted with probability one and
that every mixed equilibrium puts probability one on such a proposal.
Equilibria are eﬃcient in the sense that in equilibrium every proposer selects a Pareto
optimal alternative. However, the fact that all equilibria are in pure strategies implies that
equilibria may be ineﬃcient in a weaker sense. It is not diﬃcult to construct examples and
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mixed strategy proﬁles with associated utilities strictly Pareto dominating the equilibrium
utilities.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and Section 3
provides the existence result. Section 4 proves the converse result and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Bargaining Game
We consider the bargaining game Γ = (N, V, δ, θ). There is a set N of n individuals that
have to select a single payoﬀ vector in the set of feasible payoﬀs V, a non-empty subset
of RN . We denote the set of non-negative feasible payoﬀs by V+ = V ∩ RN+ . The vector
δ = (δi)i∈N consists of the players’ discount factors and θ = (θi)i∈N denotes the probability
according to which players are selected as a proposer. Individuals negotiate about the
alternative to be selected using a procedure deﬁned as follows.
In every time period t, starting with t = 0, nature selects player i to be the proposer
with probability θi. After history h, player i makes a proposal σ
i(h). In Sections 2 and
3 we restrict ourselves to pure strategies, in which case σi(h) corresponds to an element
in V+. After observing σ
i(h), all players (including the proposer) vote sequentially on the
proposal, the order of their responses being history independent. Each player can either
accept or reject the proposal. If the proposal is unanimously accepted, the proposal σi(h)
is implemented. As soon as the ﬁrst rejection occurs, the period t + 1 begins, with nature
selecting a new proposer, and so on.
The utility to player i of agreement on v ∈ V in time period t is given by δtivi. The
utility of perpetual disagreement is equal to 0 for all players. Players have von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions.
Our assumptions are as follows.
(A) The set V is closed and comprehensive from below. The set V+ is bounded and contains
0 in its interior.
(B) The discount factor δi belongs to [0, 1) for all i.
We analyze the stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) of Γ. A stationary strategy
of individual i speciﬁes a proposal xi and an individual acceptance set Ai. At every history
h where player i is selected as a proposer, he makes the proposal σi(h) = xi and at every
history h where player i has to respond, he accepts the proposal currently on the table if
and only if it belongs to Ai. A strategy proﬁle is a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium
if it is stationary and if it induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
The main existence result for this model is Theorem 2 in Banks and Duggan (2000).
This theorem states that when the set of feasible payoﬀs is convex, then there exists a pure
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strategy no-delay stationary equilibrium. Moreover, they have the converse result that
every no-delay stationary equilibrium is in pure strategies when the set of feasible payoﬀs
is strictly convex. We show that for an existence result, it suﬃces to make assumptions
(A) and (B). It follows in particular that convexity assumptions are not needed. Under the
modest additional assumption that weakly Pareto eﬃcient and Pareto eﬃcient points co-
incide, we obtain the converse result that every stationary equilibrium uses pure strategies
on the equilibrium path and does not involve delay.
3 Existence of Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria
in Pure Strategies
In this section we present a system of equations which is such that a solution to the system
induces an SSPE in pure strategies. Let g : RN → R be a transformation function, i.e. a
function such that v ∈ V if and only if g(v) ≥ 0, with v ∈ ∂V if and only if g(v) = 0.
Assumption A1 can be rephrased in terms of g. It is evident that A1 is equivalent to
the existence of a transformation function g satisfying the following conditions:
• g is continuous,
• g(0N) > 0,
• g(vˆ) ≥ 0 and v ≤ vˆ implies g(v) ≥ 0,
• g−1(R+) ∩ RN+ is bounded.
Let u ∈ RN be a vector of ex ante expected utilities for the players. Consider the case
where for every player i his proposal xi is immediately accepted and satisﬁes g(xi) = 0 and
xij = δjuj for j = i. Player i is the proposer with probability θi and is a responder with
probability 1− θi, so consistency with ex ante expected utility imposes
ui = θix
i
i + (1− θi)δiui.
By rearranging terms we obtain that
xii =
1− δi + θiδi
θi
ui.
For i ∈ N, we deﬁne αi = (1− δi + θiδi)/θi and we deﬁne the function pi : RN → RN by
pij(u) =
{
αiui, if j = i,
δjuj, if j ∈ N \ {i}.
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The function pi speciﬁes the proposals that are consistent with ex ante expected utilities
u.
Let v¯ ∈ RN++ be a strict upper bound on V+, so every v ∈ V+ satisﬁes v ≤ v¯.
We deﬁne the function z : [0N , v¯] → RN as follows:
zi(u) = g(p
i(u)), i ∈ N.
If zi(u) < 0, then there is no payoﬀ vector in the set of feasible payoﬀs that gives player i
a payoﬀ of αiui and players j = i a payoﬀ of δjuj. Consistency with ex ante utilities would
impose that ui be lowered. If zi(u) > 0, then there is a payoﬀ vector in V that gives player
i a payoﬀ of strictly more than αiui and players j = i a payoﬀ of δjuj. In this case it is
possible to increase ui.
The function z is related to an excess demand function as used in general equilibrium
theory and we can think of z as an excess utility function. To ﬁnd equilibria in pure
strategies, we are looking for solutions to the system of equations z(u) = 0N . Notice that
the system of equations z(u) = 0N is diﬀerent from the usual one (see Merlo and Wilson
(1995), Banks and Duggan (2000), Kalandrakis (2004, 2006)), where typically each player
is maximizing his utility subject to meeting the reservation values. Our assumptions do
not imply that the system of equations employed in the usual approach is continuous.
A function is outward pointing at a point if the function value is a non-zero element of
the normal cone at the point. A function is outward pointing if it is outward pointing at
some point. When applied to a function f : [a, a¯] → Rm, where [a, a¯] is the m-dimensional
unit interval with a  a¯, we obtain the following deﬁnition.
Definition 3.1 Let a, a¯ in Rm be such that a  a¯. The function f : [a, a¯] → Rm is
outward pointing at a ∈ [a, a¯] if f(a) = 0 and, for k = 1, . . . , m, ak = ak implies fk(a) ≤ 0,
ak < ak < a¯k implies fk(a) = 0, and ak = a¯k implies fk(a) ≥ 0.
We show next that the excess utility function z is not outward pointing.
Lemma 3.2 The excess utility function z is not outward pointing.
Proof: Clearly, z is not outward pointing at any u in the interior of [0N , v¯].
Consider u in the boundary of [0N , v¯] and i ∈ N such that ui = v¯i. Then, since
pi(u) ∈ RN+ and there is no v ∈ V+ with vi = αiv¯i > v¯i, we have that
zi(u) = g(p
i(u)) < 0.
Therefore z is not outward pointing at such a point u.
Consider u in the boundary of [0N , v¯] such that u  v¯ and ui = 0 for at least
one i ∈ N. Suppose that z is outward pointing at u. Clearly u = 0N , since z(0N ) =
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(g(0N), . . . , g(0N)) 	 0N . Let j be such that 0 < uj < v¯j. Then, since z is outward
pointing at u,
0 = zj(u) = g(p
j(u)),
so pj(u) ∈ V. Since pj(u) > pi(u) for any i ∈ N such that ui = 0, we have pi(u) ∈ V, so
zi(u) = g(p
i(u)) ≥ 0. Since z is outward pointing at u it follows that zi(u) = 0 for every i
such that ui = 0. We ﬁnd that z(u) = 0, a contradiction to z being outward pointing at u.
Q.E.D.
Functions that are not outward pointing have a zero point.
Lemma 3.3 Let a, a¯ in Rm be such that a  a¯ and let the function f 0 : [a, a¯] → Rm be
not outward pointing. Then f 0 has a zero point.
Proof: We deﬁne the function f 1 : [a− 1m, a¯ + 1m] → Rm by
f 1(a) = λ(a)(π[a,a¯](a)− a) + (1− λ(a))f 0(π[a,a¯](a)), a ∈ [a− 1m, a¯ + 1m],
where π[a,a¯] is the orthogonal projection function on [a, a¯] and
λ(a) = ‖π[a,a¯](a)− a‖∞, a ∈ [a− 1m, a¯ + 1m],
so the function λ : [a − 1m, a¯ + 1m] → [0, 1] measures the distance in inﬁnity norm from
the point a to its projection. The function λ is continuous and has the property that it is
equal to 1 on the boundary of [a− 1m, a¯+1m], equal to 0 on [a, a¯], and strictly in between
0 and 1 everywhere else. We deﬁne the function f 2 : [a− 1m, a¯+1m] → [a− 1m, a¯+1m] by
f 2(a) = π[a−1m,a¯+1m](a + f 1(a)), a ∈ [a− 1m, a¯ + 1m].
The function f 2 has a ﬁxed point, say a∗, by Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem.
Suppose a∗ belongs to the boundary of [a− 1m, a¯ + 1m], i.e. λ(a∗) = 1. Then
a∗ = f 2(a∗) = π[a−1m,a¯+1m](a∗+f 1(a∗)) = π[a−1m,a¯+1m](a∗+π[a,a¯](a∗)−a∗) = π[a,a¯](a∗) = a∗,
a contradiction. It follows that a∗ is not in the boundary of the set [a− 1m, a¯+1m], i.e. it
belongs to its relative interior. From this it follows that
a∗ = π[a−1m,a¯+1m](a∗ + f 1(a∗)) = a∗ + f 1(a∗),
so f 1(a∗) = 0m. Using the deﬁnition of f 1 it then follows that
f 0(π[a,a¯](a
∗)) = − λ(a
∗)
1− λ(a∗)(π[a,a¯](a
∗)− a∗).
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Now if a∗ is not an element of the set [a, a¯], then 0 < λ(a∗) < 1 and the vector a∗−π[a,a¯](a∗)
is a non–zero element of the normal cone of [a, a¯] at the point π[a,a¯](a
∗). But this means
that f 0 is outward pointing at π[a,a¯](a
∗), a contradiction. We conclude that a∗ ∈ [a, a¯].
Thus λ(a∗) = 0 and π[a,a¯](a∗) = a∗, so a∗ is a zero point of the function f 0. Q.E.D.
Corollary 3.4 The excess utility function z has a zero point.
A zero point u∗ of z induces a subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies of
Γ as follows. For i ∈ N, we deﬁne
x∗i = pi(u∗),
and
A∗i = {v ∈ V | vi > δiu∗i} ∪ {v ∈ V | vi = δiu∗i and ∀j = i, vj ≤ αju∗j)}.
Whenever a player i has to propose, he makes the proposal x∗i. Whenever a player i has to
respond, he accepts proposals that oﬀer him strictly more utility than δiu
∗
i or that oﬀer him
exactly δiu
∗
i and do not oﬀer more than αju
∗
j for other players j. In this construction we
exploit the degree of freedom that we have in case a player is indiﬀerent between accepting
and rejecting a proposal. This freedom is needed in particular when the set V contains
points that are only weakly Pareto optimal as Example 3.6 illustrates. Indeed, it may well
be that a proposal that maximizes the proposer’s utility subject to oﬀering the other play-
ers their reservation values is not compatible with an equilibrium. Equilibrium play may
require a proposer to settle for a weakly Pareto optimal proposal that is not Pareto optimal.
Theorem 3.5 The strategy proﬁle (x∗, A∗) is an SSPE of Γ.
Proof: It is well-known that the game Γ has the one-shot deviation property, meaning
that if there is a subgame where a player has some proﬁtable deviation from a stationary
strategy proﬁle, then there must also be a subgame where this player has a proﬁtable one-
shot deviation, i.e. a single deviation by this player at the root of the subgame. A minor
extension of the arguments in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) would prove this point.
We verify that no player has a proﬁtable one-shot deviation. Suppose at some history h
at time period t, player i is proposer and makes proposal xi, potentially diﬀerent from x∗i.
Notice that x∗i is accepted leading to expected utility δtiαiu
∗
i for player i. If x
i ∈ ∩i∈NA∗i,
then it will be rejected, leading to an expected utility of δt+1i u
∗
i < δ
t
iαiu
∗
i . If x
i ∈ ∩i∈NA∗i
it will be accepted, leading to a utility of δtix
i
i. Since x
i ∈ A∗j for j = i, it follows that
xii ≤ αiu∗i , so the expected utility to player i of proposing xi is less than or equal to the
expected utility of proposing x∗i.
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Suppose at some history h at time period t, player i is responder to a proposal v ∈ A∗i.
In equilibrium, player i accepts. The expect utility to player i is δtivi if the other players
accept and δt+1i u
∗
i if some other player rejects, so expected utility weakly exceeds δ
t+1
i u
∗
i
in any case. Would player i deviate to a rejection, then his expected utility equals δt+1i u
∗
i .
Consider a proposal v ∈ A∗i , so in particular vi ≤ δiu∗i . In equilibrium, player i rejects,
leading to expected utility δt+1i u
∗
i . A deviation to acceptance leads to expected utility δ
t
ivi
if others accept and δt+1i u
∗
i if some other player rejects. In either case, expected utility is
bounded above by δt+1i u
∗
i . Q.E.D.
Example 3.6 Consider the set of feasible payoﬀs
V = {v ∈ R2 | v1 ≤ 2, v2 ≤ 2, max{v1, v2} ≤ 1},
which is depicted in Figure 1. An upper bound on V+ is given by v¯ = (2, 2).


0 1 2
v10
1
2
v2
V
Figure 1: The set of feasible payoﬀs
Players are selected as proposer with equal probability, so θ1 = θ2 = 1/2. It follows
that αi = 2− δi. The excess utility function z is then deﬁned by
z1(u) = g(p
1(u)) = g((2− δ1)u1, δ2u2), u ∈ [0, v¯]
z2(u) = g(p
2(u)) = g(δ1u1, (2− δ2)u2), u ∈ [0, v¯].
The boundary of V consists of four types of line segments, characterized by v1 ≤ 1 and
v2 = 2, v1 = 1 and 1 ≤ v2 ≤ 2, 1 ≤ v1 ≤ 2 and v2 = 1, and v1 = 2 and 0 ≤ v2 ≤ 1. Since in
equilibrium both p1(u) and p2(u) belong to such a line segment, there are potentially sixteen
types of equilibria, where a type of equilibrium corresponds to a particular combination
of line segments to which the proposal belongs. When we solve for z(u) = 0 for each of
the sixteen resulting systems of equations, and taking into account that 0 ≤ δ1, δ2 < 1, we
ﬁnd ex ante equilibrium utility levels u∗1 and u
∗
2. From these, we can derive the equilibrium
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proposals x∗1 and x∗2 and the equilibrium acceptance sets A∗1 and A∗2. The equilibrium
proposals are displayed in Table 3. We distinguish six types of equilibrium, labeled by A
to F. The conditions on the discount factors that lead to a particular equilibrium type are
displayed in Table 3 and depicted in Figure 3.
Discount factors x∗1 x∗2
A 0 ≤ δ1 < 1, 23 < δ2 < 1 (1, 2δ22−δ2 ) ( δ12−δ1 , 2)
B 0 ≤ δ1 < 1, δ2 = 23 ((2− δ1)u∗1, 1) (δ1u∗1, 2) 12−δ1 ≤ u∗1 ≤ min{ 22−δ1 , 1δ1}
C 0 ≤ δ1 < 23 , 0 ≤ δ2 < 23 (2, 2δ22−δ2 ) ( 2δ12−δ1 , 2)
D δ1 >
2
3
, δ2 >
2
3
(2−δ1
δ1
, 1) (1, 2−δ2
δ2
)
E δ1 =
2
3
, 0 ≤ δ2 < 1 (2, δ2u∗2) (1, (2− δ2)u∗2) 12−δ2 ≤ u∗2 ≤ min{ 22−δ2 , 1δ2}
F 2
3
< δ1 < 1, 0 ≤ δ2 < 1 (2, δ22−δ2 ) ( 2δ12−δ1 , 1)
Table 1: A summary of the possible equilibrium proposals.


0 23 1
δ10
2
3
1
δ2
A A D F
B B
C E
E
F
Figure 2: Equilibrium regions
Table 1 in conjunction with Figure 3 shows that equilibria are unique for discount factors
in Regions A, C, and F in case at least one player has a discount factor below 2/3 and no
player has a discount factor equal to 2/3. When the discount factor of at least one player is
exactly equal to 2/3, we are in Regions B or E, and there are inﬁnitely many equilibria and
inﬁnitely many possible equilibrium utilities. Finally, when both players have a discount
factor above 2/3, equilibria of type A, D, and F co-exist. Figure 3 illustrates a typical
combination of proposals for the various types of equilibria. Figure 4 illustrates the three
possible equilibria when δ1 = δ2 = 5/6.
A striking feature of Example 3.6 is that the equilibrium proposals are typically not
Pareto optimal, but only weakly so. The only exception are cases where δ1 = 2/3 or δ2 =
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x∗2
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B: δ1 =
1
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2
3
x∗2
x∗1

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B: δ1 =
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6
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2
3
x∗2
x∗1

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C: δ1 =
1
3
, δ2 =
1
3
x∗1
x∗2
Figure 3: Equilibrium proposals

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Figure 4: δ1 =
5
6
, δ2 =
5
6
: A 	, D ◦, F 
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2/3, when there is a continuum of equilibria, and only one equilibrium in the continuum
involves Pareto optimal proposals.
The most extreme equilibrium proposals for player 1 are x∗1 = (2, 0), which occurs
when δ2 = 0 and 0 ≤ δ1 < 2/3, and x∗1 = (1, 2 − ε) when δ2 = (4 − 2ε)/(4 − ε) and
0 ≤ δ1 < 1. Notice that in the latter equilibrium, player 1 may oﬀer more to player 2 than
to himself, even if player 1 is more patient than player 2.
Another interesting feature of this example is that comparative statics may be coun-
terintuitive. Consider the symmetric equilibrium corresponding to Region D when both
players have discount rates exceeding 2/3. In this region it holds that increasing patience
worsens the bargaining position of a player. When discount rates converge to 1, the equi-
librium proposals of both players converge to (1, 1), a payoﬀ that is weakly dominated for
both players by alternative payoﬀs.
The example also demonstrates that equilibrium proposals are not even weakly Pareto
optimal when compared to lotteries over feasible payoﬀs. When players become suﬃciently
patient, their equilibrium proposals become arbitrarily close to (1, 1). A lottery that selects
the payoﬀ (2, 1) with probability 1/2 and the payoﬀ (1, 2) with probability 1/2 gives strictly
higher utility to both players than both equilibrium proposals.
4 A Characterization of All Stationary Subgame Per-
fect Equilibria
In this section we employ the additional assumption that each weakly Pareto–eﬃcient point
of V+ is Pareto eﬃcient. Under this assumption we show that in any stationary subgame
perfect equilibria of the game Γ each player chooses a pure strategy on the equilibrium
path, leading to a proposal which is immediately accepted by all the players. Furthermore,
the vector of ex ante expected utilities in any stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of Γ
is a zero of the function z as deﬁned in Section 3.
Recall that a point v ∈ V is said to be weakly Pareto–eﬃcient if there is no point x ∈ V
such that xi > vi for each i ∈ N . It is Pareto–eﬃcient if there is no point x ∈ V such
that xi ≥ vi for each i ∈ N with one strict inequality. We employ the following additional
assumption:
(C) Each weakly Pareto–eﬃcient point of V+ is Pareto eﬃcient.
Assumption (C) is widely used in the literature and is often referred to as the condition of
“non–levelness” of the relevant part of the boundary of the set V.
Let B be the set of Borel subsets of V . A stationary strategy for player i can be
summarized by a pair (μi, τ i) where μi : B → [0, 1] is a probability measure and τ i : V →
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[0, 1] is a B–measurable function. The number μi(B) is the probability for player i to
choose a proposal from the Borel set B, and τ i(v) is the probability for player i to accept
a proposal v. Given a strategy proﬁle (μ1, . . . , μn, τ 1, . . . , τn), let τ(v) = τ 1(v)×· · ·× τn(v)
denote the probability that the point v is unanimously accepted. Then the ex ante expected
utility ui to player i satisﬁes the following equation:
ui =
n∑
j=1
θj
∫
V
[τ(v)vi + (1− τ(v))δiui]dμj(v). (4.1)
Theorem 4.1 Let the strategy proﬁle σ = (μ1, . . . , μn, τ 1, . . . , τn) be an SSPE of Γ.
Then for each i ∈ N there exists a proposal xi in V such that μi({xi}) = 1 and τ j(xi) = 1
for all j ∈ N . Furthermore, the ex ante expected utilities u induced by σ satisfy z(u) = 0.
Proof: For i ∈ N, let ri = δiui. Deﬁne the sets A and B by
A =
⋂
i∈N
{v ∈ V | vi ≥ ri} and B =
⋂
i∈N
{v ∈ V | vi > ri}.
Step 0: ui ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N . Indeed, rejecting any proposal yields a player a utility of
zero irrespective of the strategies of other players. Thus, in any Nash equilibrium of the
game Γ the utility to any player is at least zero.
Step 1: If v ∈ V is such that τ(v) > 0, then v ∈ A.
Suppose τ(v) > 0 and consider a history h at time period 0 after which player i has
to respond to the proposal v. Notice that according to the strategy proﬁle σ all players
accept v with strictly positive probability. A rejection of v by player i yields him a utility
of ri, while accepting it yields a utility of vi with some positive probability and ri with the
complementary probability. Since, according to the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy
σ, player i accepts v with positive probability, we must have the inequality vi ≥ ri.
Step 2: If v ∈ B, then τ(v) = 1.
Suppose without loss of generality that the players respond in the sequence 1, . . . , n.
Consider a history h at time period 0 after which player n has to respond to the proposal
v. All players preceding player n have accepted the proposal v, because otherwise player
n is not requested to cast his vote by deﬁnition of the game Γ. Accepting v by player n
yields him a utility of vn, while rejecting it leads to a utility of δnun = rn. Thus player n
has to accept v with probability 1. We conclude that that τn(v) = 1.
Suppose that τi+1(v) = · · · = τn(v) = 1 for some i. Consider a history h at time period
0 after which player i has to respond to the proposal v. According to the deﬁnition of the
game Γ, the players preceding i in the response sequence have all accepted the proposal
v. The players i + 1, . . . , n will accept the proposal v with probability 1 by the induction
hypothesis, if player i accepts it. Thus accepting v by player i yields a utility of vi, while
rejecting it gives a utility of δiui = ri. We conclude that τi(v) = 1.
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Step 3: The set B is non–empty.
Suppose B is an empty set. We show next that then A ⊂ {r}. For suppose the
set A contains a point v other than r. Then the point r is not Pareto–eﬃcient and, by
Assumption (C), it is not weakly Pareto–eﬃcient. It follows that there is a point v ∈ V
such that vi > ri for each i ∈ N . But such a point v is an element of the set B, a
contradiction. This establishes that the set A is either empty or it contains the point r
alone.
For each i ∈ N and each v ∈ V, it holds that τ(v)vi+(1−τ(v))δiui = δiui, since it follows
from Step 1 that if τ(v) > 0, then v = r, whereas the equality is trivial when τ(v) = 0.
Using Equation 4.1 we ﬁnd that ui = δiui for each i ∈ N . We conclude that u = 0. But 0
belongs to the interior of V by Assumption (A), which implies that B = ∩{v ∈ V | vi > 0}
is a non–empty set, a contradiction.
Step 4: The set A equals the closure of B.
Take v ∈ A and an open neighborhood O of v. We must show that the intersection
O∩B is non–empty. Consider the point y = (1−λ)v+λr for some λ ∈ (0, 1) chosen small
enough such that y lies in the set O. Since ri ≤ yi ≤ vi for each i ∈ N and since V is
comprehensive from below by Assumption (A), y ∈ A. The point y is not Pareto–eﬃcient.
Indeed, if y = v, then y = r, which is not Pareto–eﬃcient because the set B is non–empty.
And if y is not equal to v, it is dominated by v. Hence, by Assumption (C), the point y is
not weakly Pareto–eﬃcient. Thus there is a point x ∈ V such that yi < xi for all i ∈ N .
Consider the point x() = x + (1− )y for 0 <  < 1. Since ri ≤ yi < xi() ≤ xi for each
i ∈ N and since V is comprehensive from below, x() ∈ B. And since y ∈ O, one can
choose  small enough so that x() ∈ O.
Step 5: The set X i = argmaxv∈A vi contains a single element, say xi. The point xi lies
on the boundary of V and xij = rj for each j ∈ N \ {i}.
The set X i is non–empty, because A is a compact set. Take any point x ∈ X i and
suppose rj < xj for some j ∈ N \ {i}. Deﬁne the point v by the equation
vk =
⎧⎨
⎩xk, if k ∈ N \ {j},rj , if k = j.
Thus vk ≤ xk with strict inequality for k = j. Since V is comprehensive from below by
Assumption (A), v ∈ V . Furthermore, the point v is not Pareto–eﬃcient being dominated
by x. Hence by Assumption (C) it is not weakly Pareto–eﬃcient. Therefore, there exists a
point y ∈ V such that vk < yk for each k ∈ N . Since rk ≤ xk = vk < yk for each k ∈ N \{j}
and rj = vj < yj, the point y is an element of A. Furthermore xi < yi, contradicting the
choice of x in X i.
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We have thus shown that, for each x ∈ X i, for each j ∈ N \ {i}, xj = rj . It now follows
at once that X i contains a single element.
Finally, if xi were not a boundary point of V , there would be a point y ∈ V such that
xk < yk for all k ∈ N . Such a point y would then be in the set A, contradicting the fact
that xi is an element of X i.
Step 6: It holds that μi({xi}) = 1 and τ(xi) = 1.
Consider a history h at time period 0 after which player i has to make a proposal and
let qi denote the utility of player i in the corresponding subgame of Γ. By Step 2, any point
v of B is accepted with probability 1. Hence, qi ≥ vi for each v ∈ B. Since by Step 4 the
set A is a closure of B, we must have qi ≥ vi for each v ∈ A, and therefore qi ≥ xii.
For a natural number m, let Am = {v ∈ A | vi ≥ xii − 1/m}. Notice that ri < vi ≤ xii
for each v ∈ B, so in particular ri < xii. Take an m large enough so that ri < xii − 1/m.
Let qi(v) = τ(v)vi + (1− τ(v))ri be the utility to player i from proposing the point v ∈ V .
If v ∈ V \ A, it is rejected with probability one by Step 1, so qi(v) = ri < xii − 1/m. If
v ∈ A \ Am, then qi(v) < xii − 1/m, because in this case both vi and ri are smaller than
xii − 1/m. And if v ∈ Am, then qi(v) ≤ xii, because vi ≤ xii. Thus
qi =
∫
V
qi(v)dμ
i(v) ≤ μ(V \ Am)(xii −
1
m
) + μ(Am)x
i
i ≤ xii − μ(V \ Am)
1
m
.
But since xii ≤ qi, we conclude that μ(V \Am) = 0. It follows by continuity of a probability
measure that μ({xi}) = μ(∩m∈NAm) = limm→∞ μ(Am) = 1.
Finally, for m large enough so that ri < x
i
i − 1/m,
xii ≤ qi = τ(xi)xii + (1− τ(xi))ri
≤ τ(xi)xii + (1− τ(xi))(xii −
1
m
) = xii − (1− τ(xi))
1
m
,
which shows that τ(xi) = 1.
Step 7: The vector of ex ante expected utilities u satisﬁes z(u) = 0.
By Step 5 we have xij = δjuj for each j = i. Equation 4.1 now reads
ui =
n∑
j=1
θjx
j
i = θix
i
i + (1− θi)δiui.
We thus obtain xii = αiui, where αi is as deﬁned in Section 3. Therefore x
i = pi(u). And,
also by Step 5, the point xi lies in the boundary of the set V , so z(pi(u)) = 0, as desired.
Q.E.D.
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5 Conclusion
The presence of non-convexities poses many problems in economic modeling. Such prob-
lems are usually resolved by the use of lotteries, which convexify the problem. In this
paper we argue that the canonical model of non-cooperative bargaining does not involve
such diﬃculties. Even when the set of feasible payoﬀs is not convex, there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium in pure stationary strategies. At such an equilibrium, there is no delay.
The only assumptions on the set of feasible payoﬀs that are needed for this result are that
the set of feasible payoﬀs is closed, comprehensive from below, and that its restriction to
the individually rational payoﬀs is bounded.
When we impose the mild additional requirement that the weak Pareto optimal payoﬀs
in the set of feasible payoﬀs coincide with the Pareto optimal ones, we also obtain the
reverse result that all subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies use pure strategies
on the equilibrium path and lead to absence of delay. When players bargaining in a non-
convex environment, it is not only the case that equilibria without randomization exist,
but even stronger, there are no equilibria where randomization is used. Nevertheless, it is
easy to construct example where stationary mixed strategy proﬁles would lead to Pareto
improvements of the equilibrium utilities.
Here we have restricted ourselves to the canonical model of non-cooperative bargaining.
It is natural to examine to what extent our main results are also valid in extensions of this
basic model, allowing for more general proposer selection and cake processes as studied for
instance in Merlo and Wilson (1995). We have studied the classical case with unanimous
acceptance of proposals. A generalization of our results to the case with a general set of
decisive coalitions as in Banks and Duggan (2000) will fail to hold, since in such a setting
pure strategy equilibria may fail to exist even when sets of feasible payoﬀs are convex. The
assumption of unanimous approval seems therefore to be crucial for the existence of pure
strategy equilibria and the absence of randomization in general environments.
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